Theory & Psychology recent issues

Measurement Theory, Psychology and the Revolution That Cannot Happen

Trendler, G. — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 07:47:21 PDT

Doubt is raised that revolutions in measurement theory, for example conjoint measurement or Rasch measurement, will lead to the quantification of psychological attributes. First, the meaning of measurement is explained. Relying on this, it is demonstrated that in order to attain quantification under causally complex circumstances it is necessary to manipulate the phenomena involved and control systematic disturbances. The construction of experimental apparatus is necessary to accomplish these tasks. The creation of modern quantitative science through the adoption of this method is called the Galilean revolution. Next the Millean quantity objection is formulated. If the Galilean revolution is not possible in psychology, the task of quantification is not solvable. The objection is defended. Psychological phenomena are neither manipulable nor controllable to the required extent. Therefore they are not measurable.

Value Formation of Basic Anthropological Connectivities: A General Political-Psychological Model

Bertelsen, P. — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 07:47:21 PDT

Human beings live and thrive in surroundings based on the human condition of certain basic anthropological connectivities. Amongst the vital political life, tasks can be mentioned establishing, maintaining and critically/ conformably developing these basic conditions and their political value formations. In this regard, the interdisciplinary contribution of psychology is to explore how humans as active participants can and will participate in handling such value tasks. The article presents a general, theoretical, political-psychological model, which unites precisely these two aspects: the political value formations of the basic anthropological conditions in human life, and the capability and will to participate in solving the subsequent value tasks.

The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving

Bortolotti, L. — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 07:47:21 PDT

There is an apparent tension in current accounts of the relationship between reason giving and self-knowledge. Philosophers like Richard Moran (2001) claim that deliberation and justification can give rise to first-person authority over the attitudes that subjects form or defend on the basis of what they take to be their best reasons. On the other hand, the psychological evidence on introspection effects and the literature on elusive reasons suggest that engaging in explicit deliberation or justification leads subjects to report attitudes that are not consistent with their previous attitudes or with their future behavior. On the basis of these findings, Tim Wilson (2002) argues that analyzing reasons compromises self-knowledge. I shall defend a realistic account of the effects of reason giving which is compatible with the empirical findings on introspection and also with the claim that deliberation and justification have epistemic benefits.

On Power, Freedom, and Gender: A Fruitful Tension between Foucault and Feminism

Amigot, P., Pujal, M. — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 07:47:21 PDT

In this article we highlight some aspects of Foucault’s work that are useful for analyzing the processes of subjective production and relations of power marked by gender, understood as dispositifs. Feminist theories and practices offer fundamental resources both for the development of the Foucauldian perspective itself, and for the analysis and transformation of power relations. In relation to the tension between power and freedom, we highlight the importance of two issues: first, the intermediate space between states of domination and power relations—a distinction established by Foucault—which makes possible a more precise consideration of the dispositif of gender as well as its transformation; second, the relation between practices of the self and power relations, which makes it possible to identify the conditions of possibility for the exercise of resistance and freedom.

The Physics and Chemistry of Personality

McCrae, R. R. — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 07:47:21 PDT

Physics and chemistry, two basic natural sciences, are today seamlessly integrated, but for much of their history they were separate enterprises with distinct methods and goals. Physicists have consistently sought simplicity and mathematical rigor, whereas chemists seem to have been fascinated by the challenges of complexity. Parallels between these two sciences and the two major branches of contemporary personality psychology are described in an attempt to put in perspective the daunting enterprise of constructing a unified science of human nature.

The Conceptual Connection between Lens Models and Fast and Frugal Heuristics: A Process Approach

Katsikopoulos, K. V. — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 07:47:21 PDT

I explore the conceptual connection between two judgment- and decision-making research programs: social judgment theory and fast and frugal heuristics. I point out that a main difference is in the modeling of the cues-to-criterion function that describes the organism (lens in Brunswikian jargon). Social judgment theorists typically use linear models while the fast and frugal program employs heuristics. I ask two questions: Can fast and frugal heuristics play the role of lenses? Which lens can model fast and frugal heuristics? I synthesize previous work and extend it with new analyses that focus on processes. First, I argue that fast and frugal heuristics can play the role of lenses because they can model the process of successful vicarious functioning. Second, I argue that a compensatory lens should be used for modeling the outcomes of heuristics and that a noncompensatory lens is more appropriate for modeling the cognitive processes postulated by heuristics.

Review: The Defense of Situationalism in the Age of Abu Ghraib: PHILIP ZIMBARDO, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil. New York: Random House, 2007. ISBN 9781588365873 (e-book). 2008. ISBN 9780812974447 (pbk)

Brannigan, A. — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 07:47:21 PDT

Review: What Would Freud Think?: JEROME A. WINER & JAMES WILLIAM ANDERSON, Spirituality and Religion: Psychoanalytic Perspectives. Catskill, NY: Mental Health Resources, 2007. 300 pp. ISBN: 9780979434112 (hbk)

Freeman, M. — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 07:47:21 PDT

Review: Searching for Truth: The Play's the Thing: KEN ALDER, The Lie Detectors: The History of an American Obsession. New York: Free Press, 2007. 337 pp. ISBN 0743259882 (hbk)

Barenbaum, N. B. — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 07:47:21 PDT

Validity in Psychological Testing and Scientific Realism

Hood, S. B. — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 07:49:04 PDT

Recent work in the conceptual foundations of psychometrics has concerned the question of validity. Borsboom and colleagues have challenged what they claim is the dominant theory of validity, that of Samuel Messick. In this paper I present Borsboom et al.’s concept of validity as a property of measurement instruments as well as Messick’s concept of validity as a property of interpretive inferences. I then relate their concepts of validity to scientific realism in the philosophy of science. I argue that there can be valid psychometric tests, in Borsboom et al.’s sense, only if some version of scientific realism is true. I argue that in Borsboom et al.’s and Messick’s approaches to validity, one finds the essential ingredients for a realist philosophy of science in psychological assessment. Borsboom et al. contribute semantic and ontological components while Messick provides the methodological tools for constructing an epistemology of psychological measurement. Though Borsboom et al. present their approach as an alternative to Messick’s, these two approaches to validity are potentially complementary.

A Qualitative Approach to the Study of Causal Reasoning in Natural Language: The Domain of Genes, Risks and Cancer

O'Doherty, K. C., Navarro, D. J., Crabb, S. H. — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 07:49:04 PDT

Causal reasoning has been studied extensively in experimental cognitive psychology. Generally, the focus is on how individuals learn causal relationships in their environment through observation or interventions. Although it seems self-evident that causal beliefs about some phenomena are learnt largely through linguistic channels, to our knowledge no empirical studies have addressed this issue. In this paper we investigate causal reasoning that is embedded in naturally occurring language. We focus on genetic counselling for cancer, in which complex relationships between genes, medical interventions, and cancer are communicated by health professionals to clients. We borrow the idea of graphical causal maps from previous experimental studies and show that they can be applied to the study of causal reasoning in naturally occurring talk. We see this study as complementing existing experimental research, while maintaining that the study of causal structures embedded in naturalistic language adds an important dimension to our understanding of causal reasoning.

The Theory of Reasoned Action: A Case Study of Falsification in Psychology

Trafimow, D. — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 07:49:04 PDT

Although Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action has been a leading theory in social psychology for the last few decades, it also has been an object of criticism for much of that period and subject to definitional issues about what an attitude is. One of the main recent criticisms is that the theory is not falsifiable. In contrast, I argue not only that the theory makes risky predictions, and hence is falsifiable under reasonable standards of falsification, but also that at least one of its assumptions has actually been falsified. This specific argument is used to set up a more general argument that psychologists tend to subscribe to a naïve falsificationist viewpoint, invalidly use this viewpoint to evaluate theories, and thereby prevent important empirical research from being performed.

Beyond Neurobiological Reductionism: Recovering the Intentional and Expressive Body

Garza, G., Fisher Smith, A. — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 07:49:04 PDT

This paper examines the neurobiological explanatory trend in psychology, including the related and tacit roles of ontological materialism and reductionism. In addition, the role of Cartesian dualism in both psychology and cognitive neuroscience is explored. In both, the complex relationships between mind/brain and mind/body tend to be conceptualized through the framework of either ontic dualism or attribute dualism, both of which ultimately constrain notions of embodiment. Alternatively, this paper understands the body as the inseparable unity of being-in-the-world from which the Cartesian dichotomy of "mind" and "body" is abstracted. This alternative surpasses the constraints of dualism and reframes embodiment as intentionality incarnate and ultimately as "flesh." The body, understood phenomenologically, emerges not as a "what" but as a "what—how"—the manifestation in extension of our intentionality, the flesh of our projects in and of the world. We argue that this understanding is indispensable to a properly psychological perspective on embodiment.

Materialism, Strong Psychological Continuity, and American Scientific Psychology

Greenwood, J. D. — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 07:49:04 PDT

Historians of psychology commonly maintain that early American functional and behaviorist psychology was based upon two materialist achievements of the 19th century: the neurophysiological location of psychological faculties and the theory of evolution by natural selection. Yet early American functional and behaviorist psychology was based less upon these achievements than upon the principle of strong psychological continuity associated with them, according to which the psychology and behavior of humans and animals differ only in degree but not kind. This paper charts the historical development of the association between materialism and principles of strong continuity, noting that the neurophysiological location of psychological faculties and the theory of evolution by natural selection did not provide especially good reasons for preferring theories committed to strong psychological continuity.

Review: Received Knowledge in Dated Context: SANDRA JOVCHELOVITCH, Knowledge in Context: Representations, Community and Culture. New York: Routledge, 2007. 211 pp. ISBN 0415287340 (hbk)

Verheggen, T. — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 07:49:04 PDT

Review: Power as Object of Critique: Foucault's Legacy to Psychology: DEREK HOOK, Foucault, Psychology and the Analytics of Power. Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 301 pp. ISBN 0230008194 (hbk)

Brennan, T. — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 07:49:04 PDT

Review: Fidelity to Critique: IAN PARKER, Revolution in Psychology: Alienation to Emancipation. London/Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2007. 265 pp. ISBN 0745325351 (pbk)

Hook, D. — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 07:49:04 PDT

Using Common Psychological Terms to Describe Other People: From Lexical Hypothesis to Polysemous Conception

Mollaret, P. — Wed, 03 Jun 2009 06:27:16 PDT

According to the lexical approach to personality, psychological adjectives used in everyday language (e.g., "extraverted") are a valid basis for describing the psychological properties that can be measured using personality inventories. In the present contribution, both the foundations and the consequences of this approach are subjected to a critical analysis, which comes to the conclusion that it is based on a mistaken conception of psychological terms and a questionable assumption as to the purpose of personality inventories. A fresh method is therefore put forward, defending a polysemous approach to psychological terms, partly inspired by Wittgenstein's second philosophy (1953). This approach stresses the fact that every adjective encompasses different meanings (i.e., no adjective can be summed up by a single essential meaning); and one of these meanings may become dominant, to the detriment of the others, according to the forms of life (i.e., social and linguistic practices) in which people are objectively involved. The need to link the definition of adjectives to peoples' concrete forms of life paves the way for a new and radically different program of research from that constructed within the framework of the lexical hypothesis.

Paranoia: A Social Account

Cromby, J., Harper, D. J. — Wed, 03 Jun 2009 06:27:16 PDT

Both psychology and psychiatry are dominated by individualistic accounts of paranoia (and, indeed, other forms of distress). As a corrective to these, this paper provides a social account of paranoia grounded in a minimal notion of embodied subjectivity constituted from the interpenetration of feelings, perception and discourse. Paranoia is conceptualized as a mode or tendency within embodied subjectivity, co-constituted in the dialectical associations between subjectivity and relational, social and material influences. Relevant psychiatric and psychological literature is briefly reviewed; relational, social structural and material influences upon paranoia are described; and some implications of this account for research and intervention are highlighted.

Naturalizing Perception: Developing the Gibsonian Approach to Perception along Evolutionary Lines

Withagen, R., Chemero, A. — Wed, 03 Jun 2009 06:27:16 PDT

We believe that one of the most important aspects of Gibson's ecological psychology is his attempted naturalization of perception, that is, his attempt to place perception in the context of evolutionary theory. However, the dominant neo-Gibsonian approach to perception has been criticized for being inconsistent with evolutionary theory. We argue that a central tenet of this approach indeed runs counter to evolutionary considerations. Based on an evolutionary analysis of the use of information, we sketch an alternative development of Gibson's pioneering ideas. A truly naturalistic theory of perception, we argue, should recognize both suboptimalities in perception and variation among the members of a population in what informational variables are used. Like other variable organismal features, the use of information is a function of multiple factors. We will compare this naturalistic ecological approach with both Gibson's own perspective and more recent frameworks.

Identity through a Psychoanalytic Looking Glass

Vanheule, S., Verhaeghe, P. — Wed, 03 Jun 2009 06:27:16 PDT

This paper examines how "identity" can be conceptualized and how the experience of "oneself" is influenced by the interplay of forces inside the mind and the body. We address three psychoanalytic approaches: Freud's topological views on the mental apparatus; Lacan's theory on the mirror stage, his optical model of the ideals of the subject, and his theory on the object a; and the theory of Fonagy and colleagues on how the self develops and how affect regulation takes place in the context of attachment relationships. We outline similarities and differences in how identity is conceptualized within these perspectives and we discuss clinical implications.

The Use of Meta-analysis in Psychology: A Superior Vintage or the Casting of Old Wine in New Bottles?

Shercliffe, R. J., Stahl, W., Tuttle, M. P. — Wed, 03 Jun 2009 06:27:16 PDT

In the discipline of psychology there are numerous examples of multiple published studies examining the same topic with contradictory results. Meta-analysis is viewed by proponents as a superior methodology that is based on a more reliable and objective process than narrative reviews in summarizing the results of multiple studies. To asses this claim, we reviewed 10 years of meta-analyses published in Psychological Bulletin, and examined the epistemic culture that informs the practice of meta-analysis. The practice of meta-analysis as examined within the sample of studies reviewed was characterized by methodological inconsistencies. This suggests that the methods set forth by the proponents of meta-analysis are not being followed by some researchers with rigour or consistency. Such preliminary findings, therefore, challenge the notion that meta-analysis is an inherently superior technique as compared to other forms of review. We discuss this in terms of the shared commitments and epistemic culture of researchers that rely on meta-analysis.

Essay Review: The Humanities Reforming Psychiatry: MAN CHEUNG CHUNG, K.W.M. (BILL) FULFORD, & GEORGE GRAHAM (EDS.), Reconceiving Schizophrenia. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007. 341 pp. ISBN 9780198526131 (pbk). BRADLEY LEWIS, Moving Beyond Prozac, DSM, and the New Psychiatry: The Birth of Postpsychiatry. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006. 198 pp. ISBN 0472031171 (pbk). DOMINIC MURPHY, Psychiatry in the Scientific Image. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. 410 pp. ISBN 9780262134552 (hbk)

Kerr, L. K. — Wed, 03 Jun 2009 06:27:16 PDT

The humanities have become increasingly involved in the critique of psychiatry. Scholars in philosophy, literature, cultural studies, and the performing and visual arts see psychiatry not only as a viable subject, but also as one for which their contributions have an opportunity to reform this often maligned specialty. Yet despite all the criticism directed towards the field, psychiatry has never in its history enjoyed as much success and esteem as it does today. The following essay reviews three books from the humanities dedicated to reforming psychiatry. It explores the potential success of their efforts given the present success—and entrenchment—of biological psychiatry.

Review: Freud as Fraud: TODD DUFRESNE. Against Freud: Critics Talk Back. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007. xv + 180 pp. ISBN 0--8047--5548--5 (pbk)

Overvold, G. E., Farreras, I. G. — Wed, 03 Jun 2009 06:27:16 PDT

Review: Internationalizing the History of Psychology: But How? Some Inspiring Answers: ADRIAN C. BROCK (ED.), Internationalizing the History of Psychology . New York and London: New York University Press, 2006. 260pp. ISBN 978--0--8147--9944 (cloth)

Bem, S. — Wed, 03 Jun 2009 06:27:16 PDT

German Critical Psychology: Interventions in Honor of Klaus Holzkamp

Painter, D., Marvakis, A., Mos, L. — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 03:30:05 PDT

In the political and scientific context of the 1960s, German Critical Psychology emerged as a theoretical and practical elaboration of Marxist thinking on the topic and discipline of psychology. Klaus Holzkamp played a central role in the establishment of Critical Psychology, and this special edition of Theory & Psychology honors his contributions even as it documents the development of his ideas. In this preface we briefly sketch the emergence of German Critical Psychology and introduce the contributors to this special issue.

Holzkamp's Critical Psychology as a Science from the Standpoint of the Human Subject

Tolman, C. W. — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 03:30:05 PDT

An introduction is given to Klaus Holzkamp's notion of Critical Psychology as a science from the standpoint of the subject. A brief history of the idea is presented with a summary of its theoretical and methodological context. The crux of the matter is that the object of psychological science is no mere object but also a subject that acts on reasons and makes choices among real possibilities for action. This puts the psychologist and the subject on an equal footing that turns research into a cooperative enterprise intended to enhance the understandings of both.

Klaus Holzkamp's Critical Social Science

Papadopoulos, D. — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 03:30:05 PDT

1964, 1968, 1973, 1983, 1993, 1995: This essay examines key moments in the formation of Klaus Holzkamp's critical take on social science and psychology. The main target of Holzkamp's work is to craft concepts which enable an immanent interrogation of relations of power and social control sustained through the operations of social science and psychology. Understanding power and control as an immanent question means dealing with power and control as a practical question: critical social science draws its sole justification from its capacity to alter social science and the related social and political fields.

Knowledge and Practice in Critical Psychology

Osterkamp, U. — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 03:30:05 PDT

This article outlines the essential characteristics of a psychology from the subject standpoint that starts from the principal unity of self-determination and determining the relations that determine one's own actions. The main research object in subject science understood in this way is the many forms of hindrances and obstacles, both in theory and in practice, that prevent us from realizing this unity. In contrast to standard research, where one attempts to grasp the dependency of the individual agency of others on societal structures and their cultural meanings, psychology from a subject standpoint is about relating to the societability of one's own actions, that is, analysing them to grasp their own real preconditions and implications. Consequently, in such a subject science perspective, the aim is less to gain or disseminate knowledge and more to analyse the many ways in which "critical" knowledge urging change is ignored or modified to make it compatible with one's own actual possibilities to act. As the paper details, such subject science research is not possible from an external standpoint but entails subjecting one's own assumptions and methods to a critical analysis.

Persons in Structures of Social Practice

Dreier, O. — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 03:30:05 PDT

In this article I argue for grounding psychological theories of persons in relation to structures of social practice. I introduce crucial features of such a theory of persons which is based on critical psychology and invite contributions to its further development. The theory emphasizes that persons are participants involved in personal trajectories in relation to structural arrangements of social practice. It is intended to lead to a richer and worldlier psychology. It also leads to a different understanding of professional psychological practices and of their users. To illuminate this, I present key insights from a study of clients attending therapy. Client changes do not occur only in therapeutic sessions but also in and across the contexts in which these clients live their lives in structures of social practice. In this respect, though, the structural arrangement of secluded sessions with intimate expert strangers significantly affects the mode of working of therapy in the social practice of its clients.

Reaching for Meaning: Human Agency and the Narrative Imagination

Brockmeier, J. — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 03:30:05 PDT

In this paper I am exploring meaning and meaning constructions as forms of human agency. Drawing on notions of meaning, agency, and subjectivity by Jerome Bruner and Klaus Holzkamp, my discussion emphasizes the human potentials to act, choose, and imagine as integral to the human condition. Against the backdrop of this discussion, I am particularly interested in the meaning-making resources of language, especially, of two forms of language use. One is agentive discourse—the discourse of agency—because it brings to the fore the constructive dimension of language. The other is narrative, because it is the most complex and comprehensive construction site of human imagination. I suggest that narrative imagination plays a central role in probing and extending real and fictive scenarios of agency.

Madness, Sense, and Meaning: How Does the Subject get Outside of Society and History?

Wulff, E. — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 03:30:05 PDT

The mutual interconnectedness of personal sense and generalizable meaning, of subjective grounds for action and generalized possibilities for action, is described as an existential precondition for individuals as subjects in the world. The dissolution of this interconnectedness is madness. Individuals have the choice to acknowledge this interconnectedness and thus constitute themselves as subjects in the world, or they can reject it and thereby surrender themselves to madness. The social contexts that are conducive to such acknowledgement or are detrimental to them are briefly sketched, and structural analogies between the madness of persons and that of a society that is dominated by capital are underscored.

Teaching How to Learn and Learning How to Teach

Haug, F. — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 03:30:05 PDT

This essay takes offence at Holzkamp in order to honour him. Above all, the "teaching—learning short-circuit" he proposed and the question concerning emancipatory teaching left out by this concept are critically analysed. However, the critique follows Holzkamp in many details. The objects of critique are Holzkamp's use of language, his exemplary method, his way of dealing with reality, and the determination of subjects/students. The critique offered is meant as a retrieving critique (aufhebende Kritik). On the assumption that Holzkamp's standpoint and perspective are similar to those of this critic, critique can keep Holzkamp's work alive, precisely by interrogating it. A series of doubts regarding Holzkamp's thought sharpens the critic's own procedure. In this respect, the study is nourished by his suggestions, particularly in those places where it rejects them.

What Makes us Talk about Wing Nuts?: Critical Psychology and Subjects at Work

Axel, E. — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 03:30:05 PDT

Critical Psychology is discussed as an historical science of the subject. The confrontation of human and machine is used to differentiate subjects in action from notions of isolated, formal mental mechanisms. An investigation of operators' regulation in a control room reveals issues of how subjects must re-arrange conditions to act more appropriately. The operators do not know everything necessary to act. This means that they must act on the basis of a concrete, varied, and situated understanding of their work. Since the dilemmas of work have no correct solutions, the operators must break rules to follow them and thereby re-arrange conditions. Each worker has his perspective on the problems. The differences are sorted out in conflictual cooperation. This challenges the more mediated aspects of work conditions.

Technology as Materialized Action and Its Ambivalences

Schraube, E. — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 03:30:05 PDT

The paper attempts to overcome an abstract juxtaposition of human beings and technology and to develop an understanding of the technological mediation of human subjectivity and the inner relation between sociability and materiality. In contrast to the widespread notion of technological products being unproblematic means to an end, solely expanding human agency and disposition over the world, the argumentation puts the case for an understanding of technology as materialized action and contradictory forms of life. Taking this as a basis, the paper identifies in reference to Critical Psychology as well as theories from the field of science and technology studies different dimensions of the ambivalence of technology and its meaning in human life. Furthermore the paper develops suggestions of how psychological theory might contribute to a critical social study of technology.