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Theory & Psychology
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Notes

On What Gibson (and the Rest of Us) Cannot Do without: Comment on Sharrock and Coulter (1998)

N. E. Wetherick

Edinburgh, Scotland

Sharrock and Coulter (1998) suggest that no process intervenes between the perceiver and the perceived object. Perception is simply the assimilation of objects to linguistic categories. Both Gibson and the cognitivists err in supposing otherwise, though Gibson is nearer the truth since he insists that what we perceive are objects in the real world, not mental models of them. It is here suggested (following Taylor, 1962) that all parties have overlooked the need for a learning process to enable us to perceive objects as objects in the real world, prior to categorization. It is not self-evident how we get from the visual input to the perceived object, nor can the process rationally be regarded as innate.

Key Words: cognitivism • Gibson • information • Taylor • vision

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 4, 551-556 (1999)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354399094007


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