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Functions and Causes

A Reply to Meyering (1997)

Free University, Amsterdam, huib{at}psy.vu.nl

In this reply, I begin by emphasizing the crucial distinction between `narrow' and `wide' functional explanations. Second, I question Meyering's (1997) focus on the metaphysical foundations of functional explanation and the notion of (multiple) supervenience which seems designed to provide such a foundation. More precisely, I doubt both the viability and the necessity of a causal underpinning of wide functional explanation. In my opinion, the notion of cause is as interest-relative as the notion of function, and not necessarily more fundamental. Also, the suggestion that explanations need an independent justification over and above empirical and pragmatic success is disputable.

Key Words: causal explanation • ecological psychology • functional explanation • supervenience

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 2, 187-190 (1997)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354397072003


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