This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Kenwood, C. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Does Volition Need Social Constructionism?

University of Victoria, ckenwood{at}uvic.ca

In his 1993 paper `Finding a Home for a Psychology of Volition' Rick Ansoff claims that social constructionism `has no need for a concept of volition'. It is argued here that this claim is mistaken. Social constructionism necessarily entails such a concept, whether or not it is made explicit in particular social constructionist accounts. It is further argued that social constructionism not only provides a `home' for volition, it offers as well an understanding of the concept that escapes many of the problems associated with traditional accounts. It is thus less a matter of social constructionism's needing volition than it is one of volition's needing social constructionism.

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 3, 533-538 (1996)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354396063010


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				B. S. Held What Follows?: Mind Dependence, Fallibility and Transcendence According to (Strong) Constructionism's Realist and Quasi-Realist Critics Theory Psychology, October 1, 2002; 12(5): 651 - 669. [Abstract] [PDF]

				R. Ansoff How Can there be Personal Agency without an Ontology of the Individual? Theory Psychology, August 1, 1996; 6(3): 539 - 544. [Abstract]