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Reference Points for Critical Theoretical Work in Psychology

Bolton Institute, i.a.parker{at}bolton.ac.uk

Jost and Hardin's (1996) defence of Wittgenstein fails to address the ways in which that writer's texts function in different discursive contexts to warrant essentialist and relativist positions. The strategy of assembling bits of text from Wittgenstein and Marx to illustrate similarities of perspective is unconvincing, for it neglects the mobilization of theoretical arguments in the context of institutionally situated language-games or forms of life. There are deep problems with Wittgenstein's work as the underpinning for a critical position in psychology, as I argued in my paper (Parker, 1996), but we can still, paradoxically, understand why that may be so by taking seriously some of the insights in Wittgenstein's own writing.

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 3, 395-399 (1996)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354396063003


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