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Empty Sets or Empty Self

A Response to Comments on `Whose Right is it to Define the Self?'

City College Of The City University Of New York, 76071.2575{at}compuserve.com

Responses to my critique of social constructionism (Fisher, 1995b) aver not only that my concepts of self appear dualistic, re-evoking Cartesian and neo-Cartesian dualities, but also that my claims about the self lack evidence. Freeman, Gergen, Harré, Hermans and Shotter (all 1995) reassert consciousness and conscience as social constructions. Yet, their reductionism splits mind from body. I argue to the contrary-that mind and body interrelate within the same metaphysical structuring and without such splits as Harré's proposed metaphysical/ontological. Ironically, constructionist reduction of the self to a derivation within social context multiplies dualities and disjunctions for two reasons: the use of reduction to theorize about the self, and the focus on rhetoric-not only as context for the metaphysical structuring of theoretical concepts, but also as substitute for logic in evaluating theory. I reject as fallacy the argument that it is my burden of proof to show evidence for the psychobiology of self and consciousness-that there isn't any self if I don't `show' it. Within a strategy of metaphor instead of reduction, I offer the concept of `empty set' as offset to the `empty self' of constructionists. I reassert that including biological need and assimilative functions of the self is necessary to account for agency and potentiality.

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 5, No. 3, 391-400 (1995)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354395053007


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