|
Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
|
The Necessity of Personhood as Embodied Being
Rom Harré
Oxford University And Georgetown University
The ontology presupposed in discursive psychology takes persons to be originating centres of activity. Since they are ontologically elementary they have no internal psychological complexity. As with the elementary charges and poles that ground the ontology of physics, they are specified wholly in terms of their dispositions and powers. A second important feature of the social constructionist strain in discursive psychology is the thesis that cognitive processes are properties of discourses, and hence have their primary mode of being in interpersonal symbolic interactions. Persons are singularities and each has its unique attributes. Singularity of personhood is tied up with singularity of embodiment, deeply involved in the human sense of self. In a similar manner the discursive thesis that emotion displays are embodied expressions of judgements also brings the fact of embodiment to the centre of psychological theory. These considerations dispose of the greater part of Fisher's (1995) criticisms of the discursive/constructionist position. We are embodied beings and the rules of discourses are not arbitrary.
Theory & Psychology, Vol. 5, No. 3,
369-373 (1995)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354395053004

CiteULike Complore Connotea Del.icio.us Digg Reddit Technorati Twitter What's this?
This article has been cited by other articles:

|
 |

|
 |
 
S. Wortham
Book Reviews
Discourse Studies,
May 1, 2001;
3(2):
253 - 255.
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
J. Quigley
Psychology and Grammar: The Construction of the Autobiographical Self
Theory Psychology,
April 1, 2001;
11(2):
147 - 170.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
R. N. Williams and M. S. Beyers
Personalism, Social Constructionism and the Foundation of the Ethical
Theory Psychology,
February 1, 2001;
11(1):
119 - 134.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
K. P. O'Connor and R. S. Hallam
Sorcery of the Self: The Magic of You
Theory Psychology,
April 1, 2000;
10(2):
238 - 264.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
I. Markova'
The Individual and Society in Psychological Theory
Theory Psychology,
February 1, 2000;
10(1):
107 - 116.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
G. Larner
Through a Glass Darkly: Narrative as Destiny
Theory Psychology,
August 1, 1998;
8(4):
549 - 572.
[Abstract]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
A. E. Dodds, J. A. Lawrence, and J. Valsiner
The Personal and the Social: Mead's Theory of the `Generalized Other'
Theory Psychology,
August 1, 1997;
7(4):
483 - 503.
[Abstract]
|
 |
|

|
 |

|
 |
 
H. Fisher
Empty Sets or Empty Self: A Response to Comments on `Whose Right is it to Define the Self?'
Theory Psychology,
August 1, 1995;
5(3):
391 - 400.
[Abstract]
|
 |
|
|
|