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Postmodern, Post-Cartesian Positionings on the Subject of Psychology

Pennsylvania State University, Delaware County

Descartes's philosophical position, founded upon a mind/body dualism, has had a strong influence on psychology. His dualistic system has supported the creation of a discipline in which individuals are viewed both as systems affected by mechanistic bodily emanations and as self-regulating agents replete with self-awareness and the capacity for moral responsibility. The purpose of Harwood Fisher's (1995) paper is to demonstrate that this Cartesian view is crucial to the continuation of a psychological science, which has this form of being as its subject. The major antagonists of these goals are those involved in the postmodern move in psychology, and he focuses especially on the work of Kenneth Gergen, Rom Harré and John Shotter. My attempt here is to expose the manner in which Fisher masks his desire as reason, and to invite him to accept his desires as a foundationless, a priori commitment. Further I contend that possibilities other than chaos among faceless automatons can result from the erasure of the Cartesian legacy from psychological theory. On the contrary, my feminist postmodern reframing holds that a system that enforces a hierarchy within which the rational (mind/soul) elements are designated as the masters of the inferior body (emotions) reproduces the male/female dichotomy. This polarity, a hallmark of patriarchal history, is deeply problematic from the position of postmodern feminism. Finally I pose the possibility of relational selves as an alternative to the Cartesian self as the subject of psychology.

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 5, No. 3, 361-368 (1995)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354395053003


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