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Theory & Psychology
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Notes

Social Constructionism and the Pragmatic Entente: A Reply to Osbeck

Janos V. Botschner

University Of Guelph, JBOTSCHN{at}UOGUELPH.CA

Recently in these pages, Osbeck (1993) assessed the suitability of strong vs weak constructionism as an explanatory model for psychology. The evaluative criteria adopted by Osbeck were based on a pragmatic standard of usefulness to society. This standard included the concept of generativity, which eschews moral relativism by enshrining the dignity of the individual. Osbeck concluded that only weak constructionism has the capacity to fulfil the criteria entailed in the pragmatic standard. An inspection of the evaluative issues addressed by Osbeck shows that the relative advantages ascribed to weak constructionism are equivocal and stem mainly from its typically prescriptive presentations. Moreover, weak constructionism, as described by Osbeck, does not eliminate concerns about relativism as much as it banishes them from its neo-Kantian framework. Although a re-examination of the pragmatism of William James may offer hope for alternative psychologies, its promise may resonate more strongly with Wittgensteinian than Kantian epistemology.

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 5, No. 1, 145-151 (1995)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354395051008


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