This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Moshman, D. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Reason, Reasons and Reasoning

A Constructivist Account of Human Rationality

University Of Nebraska-Lincoln

The concept of rationality has its roots in a historic philosophical conception of human beings as creatures of reason. To act on the basis of reason is to act on the basis of reasons, which in turn implies a process of reasoning. An objectivist conception of rationality sees its essence as lying in the use of reasoning processes that conform to appropriate logical norms. A subjectivist conception of rationality sees its essence in the subjective appeal to reasons. It is argued that neither approach alone is adequate. Rationality is best viewed as metasubjective objectivity. That is, the standards that embody rationality's objective component are not externally imposed rules that circumvent subjectivity. Rather, they are internally constructed via active reflection on one's subjectivity. Psychological evidence on the development of metasubjectivity is interpreted as consistent with the present approach. Implications for theory and research, and for educational and psychotherapeutic practice, are discussed.

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 2, 245-260 (1994)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354394042005


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				H. Fisher Categories and Embodied Objects: The Subjective Self and the Psychologist within Natural Psychology Theory Psychology, April 1, 2003; 13(2): 239 - 262. [Abstract] [PDF]