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Finding a Home for a Psychology of Volition

Georgetown University

The distinction proposed by Davidson (1963, 1980, 1987) between causes and reasons in the explanation of action is examined in the context of traditional positions on the issue of determinism and the will, and in light of causation theories advanced by Aristotle and Hume. It is suggested that explanations of volition limited to efficient causation and variance-partitioning approaches in empirical research are deficient, and that psychology should explicitly incorporate established philosophical positions on the will into emerging theories of volition.

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 3, No. 3, 323-336 (1993)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354393033003


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