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Shallow Reductionism and the Problem of Complexity in Psychology

UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ, pauli.brattico{at}jyu.fi

In his recent book The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, Fodor argues that computational modeling of global cognitive processes, such as abductive everyday reasoning, has not been successful. In this article the problem is analyzed in the framework of algorithmic information theory. It is argued that the failed approaches are characterized by shallow reductionism, which is rejected in favor of deep reductionism and nonreductionism.

Key Words: complexity • connectionism • emergence • evolutionary computation • global cognition • learning • reduction

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 4, 483-504 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354308091840


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