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Theory & Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 3, 297-316 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354308089787

Special Section: Can There Be Such a Thing as Embodied Embedded Cognitive Neuroscience?

Jelle van Dijk

UTRECHT UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES, jelle.vandijk{at}hu.nl

Roel Kerkhofs

STATISTICS NETHERLANDS, rkks{at}cbs.nl

Iris van Rooij

RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN, i.vanrooij{at}nici.ru.nl

Pim Haselager

RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN, w.haselager{at}nici.ru.nl

Contemporary cognitive neuroscience, for the most part, aims to figure out how cognitive processes are realized in the brain. This research goal betrays the field's commitment to the philosophical position that cognizing is something that the brain does. Since the 1990s, philosophers and cognitive scientists have started to question this position, arguing that the brain constitutes only one of several contributing factors to cognition, the other factors being the body and the world. This latter position we refer to as embodied embedded cognition (EEC). Although cognitive neuroscience's research practice and EEC do not seem to fit well together at present, it is pertinent to ask if a variant of cognitive neuroscience can be developed that sets itself research goals that are more congenial to the EEC view. In this paper we investigate this possibility. We put forth a new guiding metaphor of the role of the brain in cognitive behavior to replace the current cognitivist metaphor of the brain as an information-processing device. We also identify a research agenda that naturally arises from our metaphor. In this way we hope to provide an impetus for cognitive neuroscientists to pursue an EEC-inspired research program.

Key Words: brain—behavior relationship • cognitive neuroscience • cognitivism • embedded cognition • embodied cognition • modularity


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T. van de Laar and H. de Regt
Special Section: Is Cognitive Science Changing its Mind?: Introduction to Embodied Embedded Cognition and Neurophenomenology
Theory Psychology, June 1, 2008; 18(3): 291 - 296.
[Abstract] [PDF]