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The Rasch Model and Conjoint Measurement Theory from the Perspective of Psychometrics

UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM, d.borsboom{at}uva.nl

Annemarie Zand Scholten

UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM, zand{at}uva.nl

Kyngdon argues that psychometricians have erroneously claimed the Rasch model to be an instance of representational measurement, because the Rasch model does not map a bona fide empirical relational system (ERS) into a numerical relational system (NRS). While we agree that one does not automatically achieve a conjoint measurement representation upon fitting a Rasch model, we do not agree that the Rasch model could not in principle yield such a representation. In our view, whether this is possible depends on what one is prepared to accept as an empirical relational system. This is a philosophical question that extends beyond the scope of the formal structures advanced in representationalism and psychometrics; a question, moreover, that is not currently settled. We examine some of the ways in which one may react to this question, and conclude that Kyngdon's argument depends on a specific, and perhaps too strong, interpretation of representationalism and psychometric models.

Key Words: measurement theory • probability • psychometrics • Rasch model • representationalism

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