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Theory & Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 2, 243-264 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354307075045
© 2007 SAGE Publications

Dissenters in the Sanctuary

Evolving Frameworks in `Mainstream' Cognitive Science

Lisa M. Osbeck

UNIVERSITY OF WEST GEORGIA, losbeck{at}westga.edu

Kareen R. Malone

UNIVERSITY OF WEST GEORGIA, kmalone{at}westga.edu

Nancy J. Nersessian

GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, nancyn{at}cc.gatech.edu

Critiques of cognitive psychology and cognitive science principally target cognitivism, defined here as doctrinal commitment to computational processing over internal representations as a model of human intelligence. This paper reviews the principal points of critique, but argues that some prominent efforts within cognitive science currently exhibit conceptual and methodological broadening, to the point of revision or rejection of the core assumptions of cognitivism. Three such efforts are highlighted: Hutchins' distributed cognitive framework, Nersessian and Newstetter's ethnographic and historical analysis of innovation in engineering laboratories, and Tomasello's account of cultural evolution in relation to cognitive achievement. The paper claims that such research efforts and the philosophical frameworks that support them offer unrealized opportunities for enhanced dialogue and participation with cognitive science for psychologists critical of cognitivism. Conceptual and methodological advantages of critical engagement are acknowledged, with focus on the problems of innovation and cognitive failure in science.

Key Words: cognition • cognitive psychology • cognitive science • cognitivism • distributed cognition


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