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Familiarity and the Inferential Theory of Perception

Kenyon College

Not all empirical work in the psychology of perception has operated explicitly within a theoretical framework. But when it has, that framework has usually been provided by the inferential theory of perception. I argue that in spite of its explanatory strengths, the inferential theory of perception conceals a well-established empirical phenomenon. That phenomenon is known in ordinary parlance as ‘familiarity’. I discuss why the inferential theory of perception cannot deal with familiarity and what it reveals about the limits of the inferential theory of perception.

Key Words: familiarity • Gregory • illusion decrement • inferential theory of perception

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 4, 505-525 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354306066204


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