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Cognition and EmotionAristotelian Affinities with Contemporary Emotion ResearchUniversity of Crete, k.kafetsios{at}psy.soc.uoc.gr
Oakland University, larock{at}oakland.edu In much of the debate concerning the philosophy and psychology of cognition and emotion, Aristotles theory is taken to support a functionalist, cognition-first account. This brand of functionalism emphasizes functional role over occupant, or supervenient over physiochemical, the so-called software vs hardware distinction. We argue, instead, that this functionalist reading misrepresents Aristotle because it downgrades the significance of his ideas about the biological bases of emotions and, in particular, affect-first processes in emotions. In addition to presenting a detailed critique of this functionalist interpretation of Aristotelian psychology, we offer an alternative reading of Aristotles theory of cognition and emotion that brings to bear certain biological considerations evidenced in his arguments on the integration of form and matter (hylomorphism) and the hierarchical organization of the biological world. Based on this new reading, we identify affinities with contemporary research in the cognitive neuroscience of emotion and developmental research on emotion.
Key Words: affect Aristotle cognition and emotion neuroscience
Theory & Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 5,
639-657 (2005) This article has been cited by other articles:
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