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Real Perspectival Selves

Simon Fraser University, Jack_Martin{at}sfu.ca

The psychological self has been dismissed by some scientific naturalists and social constructionists as either illusory or fictitious. Arguments against strong forms of naturalism and constructionism that would deny the reality of the self are presented. More positively, the self is conceptualized as an embodied first-person perspective (an ‘I’) and understanding (a ‘me’), and a theory of its development during ontogenesis is presented. Following further discussion about the ‘reality status’ of the self thus understood, it is concluded that such a self is a legitimate target for expanded forms of psychological inquiry.

Key Words: first-person perspective • I & me • moral and rational agency • personhood • self

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 2, 207-224 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354305051364


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