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Method and Theoretical Psychology

State University of West Georgia

Few discussions of method appear in relation to the conception and practice of theoretical psychology, despite calls for a theoretical subdiscipline and other forms of organization. This paper argues that the popular conception of method as explicit rule detracts from recognition of the practical and ethical implications of attention to theoretical psychology's own implicit methodological problems. It challenges the necessity of the method as rule view through analysis of two divergent historical accounts of method (Descartes and Vico) arising in relation to the emergence of modern science. The principal argument is that a broader conception of method is both historically warranted and appropriate to the projects of theoretical psychology.

Key Words: history • method • pedagogy • philosophy • scholarship • theory

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 1, 5-26 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354305049742


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