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Who Really Needs a ‘Theory’ of Mind?

An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of the Autobiographical Writings of Ten High-Functioning Individuals with an Autism Spectrum Disorder

University of Surreye.i.williams{at}surrey.ac.uk

According to the theory-theory account of understanding other minds, children develop a succession of theories of mind that, just like scientific theories, postulate abstract coherent mental entities and laws, and provide predictions, interpretations and explanations. These, in turn, enable them to interact successfully with other people. Individuals with autism or Asperger’s syndrome are said to be unable to theorize about other minds, resulting in difficulties in relating to the people around them. This paper explores the possibility that we can reconceptualize the assumed relationship from the other direction, proposing that it is misleading to construe the task of achieving social understanding as a logical, scientific one. Rather, it will be suggested that typical children do not have to theorize that there are minds as they can immediately experience other people’s intentions and feelings within their affective, co-regulated interactions with them. High-functioning individuals with autism, on the other hand, do need to engage in theorizing about mind if they are to bridge the gap that exists between themselves and other people. In support of this argument, this paper presents findings from an interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) of ten published autobiographical accounts written by individuals diagnosed with either high-functioning autism or Asperger’s syndrome.

Key Words: Asperger’s syndrome • autism • autobiographical accounts • theory-theory

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 14, No. 5, 704-724 (2004)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354304046180


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