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Theory & Psychology
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Unconditional Kindness to Strangers

Human Sociality and the Foundation for an Ethical Psychology

Edward E. Sampson

Center for Critical Studies, Berkeley

Relational science has become an increasingly important paradigm in psychology. Its emphasis on the centrality of interpersonal relationships to psychological processes and its insistence that such relationships are the key to human survival and well-being appear to be the needed antidote to the problems of the individualistic paradigm. Unfortunately, however, even while talking the language of relationships, relational science continues to walk individualistically. Using Levinas' philosophy as the basis, I argue that this problem stems from adopting a conditional understanding of the interpersonal domain; this differs from Levinas's insistence on persons' unconditional obligations to be responsible for others, especially the stranger. I further argue that these unconditional obligations offer the only basis by which sociality can contribute to human survival and well-being. Four implications and a conclusion for an ethical psychology complete the article.

Key Words: ethics • kindness • obligations • relationships • sociality • stranger

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2, 147-175 (2003)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354303013002001


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