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Pragmatism, Positivism and the Quantitative Imperative

University Of Sydney, joelm{at}psych.usyd.edu.au

In this response I enlarge upon three comments by Hoshmand (2003) and Martin (2003). I endorse the recommendation for a pragmatist approach to evaluating research practice, but argue that such an approach alone will not resolve disagreements, for these generally have their origins in other matters. I agree that positivism had a profound influence upon psychology's methodological consensus and explain why it was powerless to resist the imposition of the quantitative imperative upon the discipline. I analyze one instance of Stevens' philosophical syncretism, showing that his attempt to combine the logical positivist view of mathematics with the quantitative imperative in his theory of scales of measurement involved juggling irreconcilable theses. I finish by claiming that it is counter-productive for advocates of qualitative methods to reject traditional scientific values.

Key Words: methodology • positivism • pragmatism • qualitative • quantitative

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 1, 45-52 (2003)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354303013001761


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