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Positivism, Quantification and the Phenomena of Psychology

Simon Fraser University, jack_martin{at}sfu.ca

While in general agreement with Michell's (2003) observations, arguments and positions, I believe two considerations might help to contextualize his piece further. First, it is important to note just how widespread have been psychologists' misunderstandings of positions and arguments in the philosophy of science, and what this says about the disciplinary isolation of psychology. Secondly, despite some common misunderstandings amongst qualitative researchers in psychology, there are good reasons for psychologists to resist both the quantitative imperative and the positivists' overly narrow construal of philosophy of science. These reasons relate to important, non-quantifiable characteristics of many psychological phenomena. Nonetheless, Michell's article is a timely reminder to guard against the excesses and limitations that attend any version of `methodolatry', quantitative or qualitative.

Key Words: philosophy • positivism • psychology • quantification • science

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 1, 33-38 (2003)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354303013001760


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				J. Michell Pragmatism, Positivism and the Quantitative Imperative Theory Psychology, February 1, 2003; 13(1): 45 - 52. [Abstract] [PDF]