Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here for FREE ACCESS to this landmark database

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Theory & Psychology
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Radder, H.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Conference

Psychology, Physicalism and Real Physics

Hans Radder

Free University, Amsterdam

Physicalism claims that the ontology of the world coincides with the ontology of physics. My paper offers a discussion and assessment of this claim. First, I explain why physicalism implies a straightforward ontological reductionism; hence, on an ontological reading, `non-reductive physicalism' is a contradiction in terms. Second, I argue that, without further specification, the content of `the ontology of physics' is completely undefined. Since this content is usually taken for granted in the philosophy of psychology and the philosophy of mind, the notion of physicalism has no positively determinable meaning. Third, by taking into account the full particulars of how observations of physical phenomena are realized in practice, I question the claim that reductive physicalism is confirmed by the cognitive achievements of connectionist networks.

Key Words: connectionist networks • reductive and `non-reductive' physicalism • theoretical and experimental physics

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 6, 773-784 (2001)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354301116004
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Theory PsychologyHome page
M. Barendregt and J. F. H. van Rappard
Reductionism Revisited: On the Role of Reduction in Psychology
Theory Psychology, August 1, 2004; 14(4): 453 - 474.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 Theory PsychologyHome page
H. L. de Jong
Causal and Functional Explanations
Theory Psychology, June 1, 2003; 13(3): 291 - 317.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 Theory PsychologyHome page
S. Bem
The Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology: Why a Mind is Not a Brain
Theory Psychology, December 1, 2001; 11(6): 785 - 795.
[Abstract] [PDF]