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Otto Kernberg's Object Relations Theory

A Metapsychological Critique

Montana State University, jcc{at}montana.edu

Mark H. Bickhard

Lehigh University, mhb0{at}lehigh.edu

Gregory Scott Lambeth

University of Illinois, Lambeth{at}UIUC.edu

A conceptual and empirical critique of Kernberg's influential object relations theory is presented as a case study of the limitations of structural ontological presuppositions in accounting for psychological processes. A summary overview is provided of Kernberg's systems model, the process of internalization, his developmental stages, and his conception of the borderline personality organization. Then a detailed critique considers: (1) the foundations of Kernberg's model in affective memory and units of internalized object relations; (2) the principles of construction underlying his developmental processes; (3) the resulting product of these processes, his structural model and theory of the borderline personality organization; and (4) the relationship between his metapsychology and his clinical theory. Suggestions are made for how process models of personality and psychopathology can redress the problems with structural accounts.

Key Words: metapsychology • object relations theory • process ontology

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 5, 687-711 (2001)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354301115006


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