Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here for FREE ACCESS to this landmark database

SAGETRACK

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Theory & Psychology
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Liebrucks, A.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

The Concept of Social Construction

Alexander Liebrucks

Freie Universität, Berlin, liebrux{at}zedat.fu-berlin.de

The present paper attempts to clarify the social constructionist position by way of an analysis of its central concept, namely `social construction'. (1) Three central theses connected with this concept as used in epistemological debates are identified: (a) The production of knowledge is a creative interpretation process and cannot be adequately framed within a logicistic theory of knowledge. (b) In their experiments scientists actively aspire to produce results that accord with their theories. (c) Knowledge is always grounded in a background of contingent assumptions and local investigative practices. It is argued that none of these theses is incompatible with realism. (2) Thereafter, three central theses connected with the concept of social construction as used in debates concerning the subject matter of psychology are discussed: (a) The subject of psychology is not a natural kind but an artefact. (b) There is a reflexive relationship between psychological discourses and the subject of these discourses. (c) The subject of psychology cannot be adequately analysed in natural scientific terms. It is argued that these insights have important consequences for psychological research, and yet are unintelligible against the background of anti-realist presuppositions.

Key Words: philosophy of psychology • philosophy of the social sciences • realism • relativism • social constructionism

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 3, 363-391 (2001)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354301113005


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
History of the Human SciencesHome page
F. J. Hibberd
John Anderson's development of (situational) realism and its bearing on psychology today
History of the Human Sciences, October 1, 2009; 22(4): 63 - 92.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Theory PsychologyHome page
J. Shotter and J. W. Lannamann
The Situation of Social Constructionism: Its `hnprisonment' within the Ritual of Theory-Criticism-and-Debate
Theory Psychology, October 1, 2002; 12(5): 577 - 609.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Theory PsychologyHome page
B. S. Held
What Follows?: Mind Dependence, Fallibility and Transcendence According to (Strong) Constructionism's Realist and Quasi-Realist Critics
Theory Psychology, October 1, 2002; 12(5): 651 - 669.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Theory PsychologyHome page
M. W. Katzko
The Construction of `Social Constructionism': A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Debate
Theory Psychology, October 1, 2002; 12(5): 671 - 683.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Theory PsychologyHome page
R. Mather
Gergen's Social Constructionism: Postmodern or Post-Hegelian?
Theory Psychology, October 1, 2002; 12(5): 695 - 699.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Theory PsychologyHome page
D. J. Nightingale and J. Cromby
Social Constructionism as Ontology: Exposition and Example
Theory Psychology, October 1, 2002; 12(5): 701 - 713.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Theory PsychologyHome page
K. J. Gergen
Construction in Contention: Toward Consequential Resolutions
Theory Psychology, June 1, 2001; 11(3): 419 - 432.
[Abstract] [PDF]